Offense and pitching have been at the forefront of the analytics movement since its inception. It started out innocently enough, with teams targeting players with high OBPs and low FIPs at the turn of the millennium. Now we have rate stats, weighted stats, spin rates, expected results, expected results when a batter makes contact against a high spin pitch... it's a rabbit hole. Sure, some new metrics are superfluous, redundant or just not particularly useful, but generally speaking, almost every new development gives us new tools for measuring hitting and pitching and a better insight into a player's contributions.
But defense has lagged behind. While it's generally accepted that errors and fielding percentage should not be the only metrics to measure how a defender's aptitude, the alternatives are not exactly perfect either, especially for infielders. Shifts are a big part of the problem. Sure, you got an out, but how much of that was due to the fielder and how much of it was the good scouting report? While Fielding Bible recently updated Defensive Runs Saved (DRS) to account for shifts better, it is an improvement rather than the perfect, final answer.
Ultimate Zone Rating (UZR) is used for FanGraphs' WAR calculations, but even they admit, "We don’t know precisely where a ball is hit, we don’t know exactly how long the ball was airborne or on the ground before it lands, is touched, or passes a fielder, and we don’t know exactly where the fielders were positioned when the ball was hit. Many decisions we have to make regarding the UZR methodology involve a trade-off. Given the limitations of the data, while the outcome is quite reliable, especially with large amounts of data (say, several years for a player), it is not perfect."
For my money, Baseball Prospectus' FRAA (Fielding Runs Above Average) is the best way to evaluate catcher defense, taking into account their framing and blocking skills and their ability to control the running game. I'm not as crazy about FRAA for other position players, though, because it falls into the same pitfalls as UZR and DRS. It's by no means bad, but it can be improved.
Baseball Savant offered a better alternative in 2018 by introducing Outs Above Average, or OAA, which takes into account where a player was originally positioned and how much ground they covered on each play. This is the gold standard for evaluating defense in 2020. Shifts are taken into account this way and we know exactly what fielder did on every play and what their odds were of being successful. While OAA was originally just for outfielders, last week they updated it to include infielders, too.
If you want to get in the particulars of OAA and how it is calculated, I would recommend Mike Petriello's piece for MLB.com. If you want to get into the math behind OAA, read Tom Tango's accompanying post.
And if you just want the short version, here's how OAA is calculated for infielders, per Petriello:
• How far the fielder has to go to reach the ball ("the intercept point")
• How much time he has to get there
• How far he then is from the base the runner is heading to
• On force plays, how fast the batter is, on average
Here's a quick example: a batter puts a ball in play. Based on the location of the batted ball and the speed of the hitter, Baseball Savant calculates the odds of this play resulting in an out at 90%. If the fielder succeeds, they get 0.1 OAA. If they fail, they got docked 0.9 OAA. The cumulative total of the outcomes of all their collective plays is pulled together, and the final result is their OAA.
Whenever I started writing this Mound Visit, I intended to focus on Adam Frazier and Kevin Newman. Frazier, surprisingly, ranked first among second basemen in OAA. Newman, perhaps just as surprisingly, ranked near the bottom for shortstops. That story will have to wait until next time, though, because someone else really grabbed my eye. Someone very unexpected.
Buckle up, folks. We're doing a deep dive into Colin Moran's defense.
Moran is, to put it nicely, a poor defender. Whether you want to base that assessment on errors (14), DRS (-13), UZR (-8.8), OAA (-7) or even just the eye-test, he makes a lot of miscues. That does not even take mental mistakes- like this one from June 2- into account. Here, the bases are loaded with no outs. The ball is hit to Moran, and he decides to just toss it to first, forgetting to touch the bag for the force out at third:
Personally, I think that was the worst play by a Pirates fielder last year. If he went home with the throw, the Pirates would have gotten an easy out and kept a run off the board. Just stepping on third and not making a throw would have been a better outcome than what Moran did here. With the exception of air balling the throw, this is the worst possible outcome from this situation.
So is there any hope for his defense? Can he get better? Not good or even average. Just better. With the new information Baseball Savant has brought to light, I think so. We'll take a look at how he performed in the three main directions a third baseman will need to range to to make a play: to their left, their right and going in on the ball.
Going to his left
Here were the top three third basemen last year in OAA on balls to their left:
Nolan Arenado: 12
Rafael Devers: 9
Moran: 6
Yes, I'm being serious. That caught me off guard, too.
Moran was actually really good at ranging to his glove side. There were 62 plays to his left (56 as a third baseman, 3 at second and 3 at first) that Statcast deemed playable, and believe it or not, he got all 62. This is all the more impressive because last year he had -7 OAA going to his left, making just 47 of 59 potential plays.
Moran's success here does come with a major trade-off, though.
Going to his right
Here were the bottom three third basemen last year in OAA on balls to their right:
Todd Frazier: -4
Rafael Devers: -4
Colin Moran: -8
That's some serious give and take there. Moran had a hard time reaching across his body to make plays. Ground balls and line drives to the right side of the third baseman tend to turn into extra-base hits, too.
Moran had one more problem:
Going in on the ball
I'll spare you the list for this one. Last year, Moran had -4 OAA on balls in front of him. That was the fifth worst total among third basemen. The Pirates allowed the second most weak contract hits last year, with the majority going down the third base line.
What makes this interesting is Moran was quite good going in on the ball in 2018. He was two outs above average. We're working with smaller sample sizes here, but this is odd. Unless, something changed.
And something did change.
The possible solution
Let's take a look at where Moran was positioned.
Last year, Moran's average starting depth was 124 feet away from home plate. That was not only the deepest out of any corner infielder last season (min. 150 PA), it is the deepest in any corner infielder in the four years Baseball Savant has been tracking the stat. The next closest out of regular third basemen was Eduardo Escobar at 121 feet. Now three feet may not seem like a big difference, but that is roughly one step back from the next deepest position player.
To get a visualization, here is where Moran set up, on average, compared to other regular third basemen last year. Moran is highlighted:
And here is where Moran was positioned in 2019 (red) compared to where he was in years past:
So Moran played deeper last year and developed a problem coming in on the ball. This sounds like a simple solution: Just move him back up a step. The only concern is how will that impact him going to his left. How much of an impact did having another fraction of a second to make plays to his glove side have? I don't think his improvement was completely because he played deeper, but it does look like it helped. Perhaps they should slowly inch him closer to the plate. That way he can still make the play to his left while improving his odds at making the plays in front of him.
Regardless of where he is depth wise, it is pretty clear the Pirates need to position him another step to his right. Going based on the first positioning chart, we can see that while he is shaded a little closer to third than about half the league, he is still off the line quite a bit compared to other third basemen. He has struggled making plays in that direction, and when he can't get to a ball there, it becomes an extra-base hit. Sure, moving Moran will cause more hits to go through that 5.5 hole between shortstop and third, but those will be singles. Playing the line better will turn potential doubles into outs. It's a good trade.
Of course, this theory could all be for naught. Moran's time with the Pirates may be nearing the end. Ke'Bryan Hayes was added to the 40-man roster this offseason and is almost major league ready. When the opportunity presents itself, he will overtake the position from Moran. But until then, Moran has another chance- perhaps his last- to prove he is a legitimate major leaguer. He needs to improve defensively to do that, and while better positioning won't fix all of his problems, it looks like it would help.
Data and charts courtesy of Baseball Savant.
MORE MOUND VISIT
Jan. 3: The all-decade worst Pirates team
Jan. 1: The all-decade best Pirates team
Dec. 21: Can catchers get by with just defense?
Dec. 3: Ten catchers to replace Diaz
